Implementing Pass-through Authentication (PTA) ensures that Azure AD delegates the authentication process directly to the on-premises Active Directory in real-time. When a user signs in, Azure AD routes the authentication request through a secure channel to the on-premises Authentication Agent, which verifies credentials against AD.
If a user account is disabled in Active Directory, authentication immediately fails because the request is validated directly against the on-premises domain controllers - there's no delay or dependency on synchronization intervals.
From Microsoft documentation (SC-300 official guide):
"Pass-through Authentication provides real-time authentication directly against on-premises Active Directory.
If an account is disabled on-premises, authentication requests are denied immediately." Thus, enabling PTA satisfies the requirement for immediate blocking of disabled accounts.
# Correct Answer: A. Yes

In SC-300, Azure AD Identity Protection is the prescribed control to "automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials." That specific user risk-Leaked credentials-relies on Microsoft comparing known breached username/password pairs with what Azure AD can evaluate. The study materials explain that Identity Protection "detects leaked credentials when Microsoft finds a match with the user's current credentials," and also note that password hash synchronization (PHS) can be enabled even if your sign-in method is Pass-through Authentication or federation. A common exam call-out is that without PHS, Azure AD has no hash to compare, so the leaked-credential signal is unavailable. Enabling PHS (you can keep PTA as the active sign-in method) allows Identity Protection to raise user risk and enforce policy actions such as require password change or block access. By contrast, Azure AD Password Protection addresses banned/weak passwords at change time, not breached-credential telemetry; federation choices (e.g., PingFederate) don't deliver the leaked-credential signal; and authentication method policy controls how users perform MFA (e.g., methods) rather than whether leaked credentials are detected. Therefore, to meet the requirement to
"automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials," the minimum correct step is to enable password hash synchronization while retaining PTA-exactly as recommended in SC-300 guidance.
Topic 1, Litware, IncOverview
Litware, Inc. is a pharmaceutical company that has a subsidiary named fabrikam, inc Litware has offices in Boston and Seattle, but has employees located across the United States. Employees connect remotely to either office by using a VPN connection.
Identity Environment
The network contains an Active Directory forest named litware.com that is linked to an Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) tenant named litware.com. Azure AD Connect uses pass-through authentication and has password hash synchronization disabled.
Litware.com contains a user named User1 who oversees all application development. Litware implements Azure AD Application Proxy.
Fabrikam has an Azure AD tenant named fabrikam.com. The users at Fabrikam access the resources in litware.
com by using gu est accounts in the litware.com tenant.
Cloud Environment
All the users at Litware have Microsoft 365 Enterprise E5 licenses. All the built-in anomaly detection polices in Microsoft Cloud App Security are enabled.
Litware has an Azure subscription associated to the litware.com Azure AD tenant. The subscription contains an Azure Sentinel instance that uses the Azure Active Directory connector and the Office 365 connector.
Azure Sentinel currently collects the Azure AD sign-ins logs and audit logs.
On-premises Environment
The on-premises network contains the severs shown in the following table.

Both Litware offices connect directly to the internet. Both offices connect to virtual networks in the Azure subscription by using a site-to-site VPN connection. All on-premises domain controllers are prevented from accessing the internet.
Delegation Requirements
Litware identifies the following delegation requirements:
* Delegate the management of privileged roles by using Azure AD Privileged Identity Management (PIM).
* Prevent nonprivileged users from registering applications in the litware.com Azure AD tenant-
* Use custom catalogs and custom programs for Identity Governance.
* Ensure that User1 can create enterprise applications in Azure AD. Use the principle of least privilege.
Licensing Requirements
Litware recently added a custom user attribute named LWLicenses to the litware.com Active Directory forest.
Litware wants to manage the assignment of Azure AD licenses by modifying the value of the LWLicenses attribute. Users who have the appropriate value for LWLicenses must be added automatically to Microsoft
365 group that he appropriate license assigned.
Management Requirement
Litware wants to create a group named LWGroup1 will contain all the Azure AD user accountsfor Litware but exclude all the Azure AD guest accounts.
Authentication Requirements
Litware identifies the following authentication requirements:
* Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all Litware users.
* Exempt users from using MFA to authenticate to Azure AD from the Boston office of Litware.
* Implement a banned password list for the litware.com forest.
* Enforce MFA when accessing on-premises applications.
* Automatically detect and remediate externally leaked credentials
Access Requirements
Litware wants to create a group named LWGroup1 that will contain all the Azure AD user accounts for Litware but exclude all the Azure AD guest accounts.
Monitoring Requirements
Litware wants to use the Fusion rule in Azure Sentinel to detect multi-staged that include a combination of suspicious Azure AD sign-ins followed by anomalous Microsoft Office 365 activity.

In Azure AD Identity Protection, risk detections are classified into sign-in risks and user risks . According to Microsoft's SC-300 Study Guide and Identity Protection documentation , a user risk represents the probability that an account has been compromised . Microsoft aggregates multiple sign-in signals and applies its threat intelligence algorithms to determine whether a user's identity may be at risk.
Among the listed options, Password spray , Anonymous IP address , and Unfamiliar sign-in properties are sign-in risk detections , while Azure AD threat intelligence is the only type classified as a user risk detection
.
Microsoft Docs states: "User risk detections are generated by Azure AD threat intelligence when Microsoft detects that user credentials appear to be compromised."

According to the Microsoft SC-300: Identity and Access Administrator Study Guide and Microsoft Learn documentation on Managed Identities for Azure Resources , the recommended and most secure method for an Azure resource (like an App Service) to access another Azure resource (such as an Azure SQL Database) is through Managed Identities.
Managed identities allow Azure services to authenticate securely to other Azure services that support Azure AD authentication, without requiring the use of credentials stored in code, configuration files, or key vaults.
There are two types of managed identities:
* System-assigned managed identity
* Created and tied directly to the lifecycle of a specific Azure resource (e.g., App Service).
* When the resource (App1) is deleted, the identity is automatically deleted as well.
* Best suited when a single resource requires authentication to access another Azure service.
* User-assigned managed identity
* Created as an independent Azure resource.
* Can be assigned to multiple services and managed separately.
* Useful for scenarios requiring shared identity or cross-service authentication management.
* App1 (Azure App Service) must access db1 (Azure SQL Database).
* Credentials should be available only to App1, meaning other resources should not share or reuse the identity.
* Administrative effort should be minimized, implying automatic management of credentials and lifecycle.
Scenario Analysis: Hence, a system-assigned managed identity is the best solution because it meets all three conditions:
* No manual credential management (Azure handles authentication token issuance automatically).
* The identity exists only for App1 (it's unique to that resource).
* Simplified lifecycle - identity is created and deleted automatically with App1.
# Official Microsoft Documentation (aligned with SC-300 exam objectives):
"System-assigned managed identities are ideal for scenarios where a single Azure resource requires access to another Azure service and you want Azure to automatically manage the identity's lifecycle."
"Managed identities eliminate the need for developers to manage credentials in code or configuration files."

Explanation:

In SC-300, publishing an on-premises web app to Azure AD users is performed with Azure AD Application Proxy. The exam materials and Microsoft curriculum explain that you deploy an Application Proxy connector on a Windows Server joined to your on-premises network, which brokers requests to internal apps such as an ASP.NET site. The connector is designed for perimeter-friendly deployments: "Application Proxy connectors only make outbound connections to the Application Proxy service" and "no inbound ports need to be opened in the firewall." Because the connector initiates the session to Azure over TLS, the firewall requirement is simply to permit the connector's outbound HTTPS to the service endpoints. This aligns with the least- exposure pattern emphasized in Identity Governance: you avoid publishing inbound listener rules and still support Azure AD features like Conditional Access and MFA at the cloud edge. Alternatives in the list do not meet the publishing requirement: the Password Protection DC agent and Password Protection proxy service are for banned-password enforcement, and Web Application Proxy in Windows Server is a different reverse- proxy technology not required when using Azure AD Application Proxy. Therefore, to publish App1 securely to Azure AD users, install Azure AD Application Proxy on Server4 and allow outbound HTTPS from Server4 through Firewall1.